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Abstract 
A  fundamental  and  highly  relevant  question  for  climate  policy  design  is  whether  price 
controls, such as CO2 taxes, or quantity restrictions, such as emission quotas, should be 
preferred. 
This paper shows that as the reach of climate policies is limited either geographically or in 
terms of suboptimally low reduction targets, the likelihood of price measures to be more 
advantageous  in  terms  of  minimizing  uncertainty-related  welfare  losses  increases.  The 
increase in the relative advantage of the price mechanisms over quantity measures may be 
more  than  proportional  to  the  regional  limitations  of  policies,  suggesting  that  even  for 
relatively important climate coalitions, the identified factor implies a clear advantage for price 
measures. 
Unlike previous theoretical literature addressing the question of prices versus quantities, 
which  typically  relied  on  the  assumption  of  first  best  (i.e.,  global)  policies,  this  paper 
examines local or regional climate policies, as corresponds to any currently realistic accord. 
Illustrating  the  main  thought  of  the  analysis,  I  explain  why,  in  the  example  of  policies 
corresponding  to  the current Kyoto  mechanism,  the simple  theoretical  weighting  of the 
price versus the quantity approach seems to favor price mechanisms independently of the 
exact form of the global abatement cost and benefit curves. 
Keywords 
Prices versus quantities, greenhouse gas tax, emission quotas, tradable permits, uncertainty, 
emission  abatement  costs,  climate  change  costs,  emission  abatement  benefits,  regional 
climate policy, unilateral climate policy. 
JEL Classification 
Q54, Q52, D81, Q40 1 Introduction
For decades, economists have been weighing the advantages and drawbacks of price and
quantity measures in climate and other policies, in both theoretical as well as empirical
frameworks. In theory, both measures could be equivalent in a framework with complete
knowledge, i.e., if both the cost and the bene￿t curve for emission abatements were known
without any uncertainty.
In his seminal contribution, using a theoretical framework with uncertainty about the costs
and bene￿ts from externality reductions, Weitzman (1974) showed four decades ago that
price and quantity measures lead to di￿erent welfare losses and that it may not be clear a
priori which type of measure achieves lower expected losses. In his analysis, he assumed
that both possible policies could be implemented in an optimal way with respect to the
available knowledge, i.e., where the planner governed over the whole economy responsible
for the externality and where the planner was unrestricted in choosing the ex ante level
of ￿ depending on which of the two options is opted for ￿ prices, i.e., a tax, quantities,
i.e., a system of (tradable) permits. His results suggested that if the curvature of the
abatement-bene￿ts function exceeded the curvature of its abatement-cost counterpart, a
quantity measure would be preferable; otherwise the price mechanism would be preferable.
Current literature still largely considers this result in its raw format as a theoretical rule
for the decision between the two policy options in the climate change debate, even though
questions about the practical operability are in addition considered as well. A major ex-
tension of Weitzman’s theoretical considerations has been the recognition that greenhouse
gases in the atmosphere represent a stock pollutant consisting of aggregate emissions over
a long time period, being determined only to a limited extent by ‘current’ emissions over
a short period. This fact tends to smooth the abatement bene￿t curve and thus to favor
price mechanisms (see, e.g., Nordhaus (2005)). However, without substantial information
about the exact abatement bene￿t and abatement cost curves, this may not be as strong
a point in favor of tax schemes as the argument may imply on ￿rst sight. Policies that are
seriously concerned with uncertainty-induced welfare losses may need to commit to mea-
sures that are stable over a period of several decades to prevent large economic losses. The
reason for this necessity is that industry makes certain investments; for instance, power
plants may run for 40 years, and they have high adaptation costs to new policies once the
plants are constructed in a way that is optimized for a certain policy framework. Hepburn
(2006) mentions that while the stock argument implies taxes to be clearly favorable for
short policy periods, permits could be favorable for commitments over several decades.
While therewith there could eventually still be some requirement to analyze cost and ben-
e￿t curvatures for speci￿c climate policies in detail, the following shows that for realistic
climate policies, such analysis may not be necessary, as the advantage of tax measures in
limiting the expected uncertainty-induced welfare losses seems indeed unambiguous.
3Climate policies implemented so far and those likely to be implemented in the near future
systematically depart from optimal policies considered in Weitzman (1974) in at least
two crucial ways. First, none of the measures implemented so far covers nearly all global
greenhouse gas emissions. Second, none of the politically implemented measures is strin-
gent enough to be considered to correspond to the ex ante conceivable optimal abatement
strategies. Nonetheless, Weitzman’s still frequently cited analysis has not been extended
to account for these two di￿erences. For example, Hepburn (2006) reviews the literature
on the prices versus quantities question and even mentions the absence of a global regula-
tor. He does not consider that the theoretical analysis of the uncertainty-induced welfare
losses undergoes an important change when, instead of the global policy, a unilateral ac-
tion of a single country or other entity is considered. The following analysis ￿lls this gap
and shows that the classic Weitzman result is fundamentally altered and that prices may
generally be preferable in the cases where either (i) policies are applied only in parts of
the global economy, such as is the case of unilateral or regional climate policies, or (ii)
where policies result in only limited abatements compared with the optimal policy, which
is likely to be the case even for future global treaties, should they ever be agreed upon.
I brie￿y illustrate this result with the example of the Kyoto accord, showing that even
without an analysis of the exact form of the cost and bene￿t functions, the uncertainty
about abatement costs and bene￿ts seems to favor a price mechanism. This result shows
an even stronger trend when more local unilateral climate policy is considered.
2 The Model and Weitzman’s Result
Three characteristics of both climate bene￿ts and economic costs induced by emission
reductions are of primary importance for the theoretical decision about the optimal abate-
ment level and whether price measures, such as a carbon tax, or quantity measures, such as
a cap-and-trade scheme, may be more desirable. The ￿rst characteristic concerns marginal
costs and marginal bene￿ts from initial abatement. For a strictly positive abatement level
to be desirable, the initial marginal bene￿ts must exceed the marginal abatement costs
in the laissez faire situation. The second and third elements, which are crucial for the
question between price and quantity measures to be important even in a model neglect-
ing most practical issues related to policy implementation, are the uncertainty about the
marginal abatement costs and bene￿ts and the non-linearity of the cost and bene￿t curves,
i.e., the non-constancy of their marginal values. These characteristics appear to re￿ect
reality. Energy is an essential primary input for all sectors of economic activity, and most
of the energy consumed today depends on the combustion of fossil fuels, which results
in CO2 emissions that currently can be released into the atmosphere for free. Therefore
there must almost certainly be processes for which emissions could be reduced at marginal
4abatement costs close to zero. On the other hand, the current intensity of global warming
already seems to imply costs in various parts of the world. Thus, the ￿rst condition ￿
that initial marginal abatement bene￿ts exceed initial marginal abatement costs ￿ seems
to be given. Furthermore, there is substantial uncertainty both about the di￿erent cli-
mate change costs associated with greenhouse gas emissions and correspondingly about
the bene￿ts resulting from emission abatements, as well as about the economic costs for
abatements. Therefore the second characteristic is clearly demonstrated as well. Finally,
substantial non-linearity of climate costs and emission abatement bene￿ts is widely ac-
knowledged. Abatement costs cannot realistically be constant over a longer range, and it
can generally be expected that cheaper abatements are chosen ￿rst and that ever more
expensive measures are implemented as the policy becomes more stringent. Therefore,
the abatement cost curve is likely to be convex. In fact, this trend has been con￿rmed
by applied studies. Estimated carbon abatement cost curves show that marginal costs for
di￿erent abatement levels tend to spread over a whole set of orders of magnitude with a
relatively large fraction of the possible abatement levels eventually being achievable with
only a small fraction of the costs for a larger abatement, leaving little doubt about the
highly convex nature of any typical CO 2 emission abatement scenario. The abatement
bene￿ts, on the other hand, seem very likely to describe a concave curve, according to
climate economists.
The remainder of this section sets up the model in which the uncertainty-induced welfare
losses of the two policy types are compared and derives the Weitzman rule about the
preferable policy choice between tax and cap-and-trade mechanisms (Eq. 3).
In line with Weitzman’s and subsequent contributors’ approach, and to account for the
three previously mentioned characteristics, we assume quadratic abatement bene￿t and
cost functions (see, e.g., Weitzman (1974), Pizer (1997) and Pizer (1999)), with some
uncertainty about the values of the linear parameters. To point out how in the case
of a policy with limited reach the theoretical decision rule departs from the original
result concerning optimal policies, we start with the functions that map global emission
abatement qg into global bene￿ts from the corresponding limitation of the climate change,
bg(qg), as well as corresponding global economic abatement costs, cg(qg), and then explain
the Weitzman result.
The cost and bene￿t functions are












where, in order for an inner solution with a well-de￿ned strictly positive optimal abatement
5level to exist, and corresponding to climate economists’ broad agreement, the parameters
have the following properties: b > c > 0,  > 0, i.e., the abatement bene￿ts describe a
concave curve and the costs a convex curve, both initially being upward sloping, with a
steeper initial slope for the bene￿ts curve.
Corresponding to Weitzman (1974), we assume some uncertainty about the marginal
abatement costs and bene￿ts, allowing for some limited variability of the linear parame-
ters, c and b. As Appendix A graphically illustrates, (i) welfare losses from uncertainty
only about climate bene￿ts, i.e., from the variability of b, are the same for price as for
quantity measures, and (ii) the expected welfare losses arising from uncertainty about b
and about c are purely additive. Therefore, it is su￿cient to examine the welfare losses
expected from uncertainty about the abatement costs to determine which type of measure
yields lower expected welfare losses.
Thus, from here on, we will simply attribute all uncertainty to the cost curve. In this
case, the situation can be depicted as in Fig. 1. Given the marginal abatement cost curve
(mc) and the marginal bene￿t curve (mb), the optimal abatement level q, resp. the
optimal tax level , is de￿ned by the intersection of these two curves. However, given
some uncertainty about the marginal cost curve, we may overestimate or underestimate
the marginal costs ( ^ mc1 or ^ mc2). In this case, the estimate of the optimal tax level or the
emission cap will also be a￿ected; instead of being ￿xed at the optimal levels, they will be
determined by the intersection of the marginal bene￿ts curve and the realized estimate of
the marginal cost curve, corresponding to the green and the red curves for the estimates
^ mc1 or ^ mc2 in the ￿gures. Correspondingly, instead of the optimal values, the abatements
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Figure 1: Uncertainty-induced welfare losses for permits (red triangles) and for taxes
(green triangles). Losses for permits are smaller if the marginal bene￿ts curve is steeper
6(left plot), while losses for the tax are smaller if the marginal cost curve is steeper (right
plot). The dashed lines represent two examples of imprecise estimates ( ^ mc) of the real
marginal abatement costs (mc). 1
Given this imprecision, deadweight losses will accrue in the form of unrealized potential for
further abatement gains (left of the optimum, given the cost estimate ^ mc1) or excessively
large abatements (right of the optimum, given the estimate ^ mc2), corresponding to the
colored triangles in the plots of Fig. 1 (green for the tax measure and red for the quotas).
Besides depending on the deviation of the marginal cost estimates from the true value,
these losses’ sizes are in￿uenced by the slopes of the curves.
When considering a tax, if the estimated marginal cost curve deviates vertically by an
amount mc from its real position, basic geometry shows that the estimate of the optimal
tax will deviate by t = mc
b
c+b, where c and b indicate the absolute values of the
slopes of the marginal cost and the marginal bene￿t curves. The corresponding deadweight
loss can be characterized by the deviation of the resulting emission abatement from the
optimal value. This deviation can again be determined from Fig. 1 using some simple





As for the quota, the deviation of the estimate of the optimal value from its true value




Thus, given some speci￿c deviation of the estimate of the marginal cost curve from the
real marginal costs, the ratio of the implied deviation in the resulting abatement level








c. As can also be seen in Fig. 1, higher deviation of the abatement



















g(qg) express the second derivatives of the abatement bene￿t and the
abatement cost curves in the vicinity of the opted for abatement level qg. Eq. 3 corre-
sponds to the famous result of Weitzman (1974).
3 Policy with Limited Reach
Currently, all odds are against a global climate policy targeted at an approximately op-
timal emission level being implemented in the near future. Instead, only a few countries
seem willing to make a noticeable contribution to limiting climate change, and even these
1See also the related graph in Pizer (1997).
7countries seem to be doing so only if they are sure that the associated direct economic costs
are small, preventing measures that imply broad-based and substantial carbon prices. In
this section, this fact is taken into account by deriving what the di￿erent characteristic
limitations of the climate policies have on the result in Eq. 3.
The ￿rst point concerns the fact that a policy is not implemented globally, but only
regionally. To illustrate this fact, we will assume that the policy covers a speci￿c fraction
of the global economy resp. of its emissions and that Eqs. 1 and 2 represent the abatement
cost and bene￿t curves that would be relevant if the policy were a global and optimal one.
The following analysis shows how the nature of the respective curves to be considered for
the regional policy can be derived from the curves for the global policy.
Global emission abatement cost curves are generally strongly convex, because of the large
range of very di￿erent possibilities of substituting various types of inputs and processes
or even products of an economy. The relative form of such curves should not primarily
depend on whether the global or regional economy is considered: even a national economy
is likely to o￿er a large range of the di￿erent types of abatement possibilities. Therefore,
a global cost function with the global emission reductions as a parameter, cg(qg), may be





)  a; (4)
where a is 0 < a < 1, and represents the fraction of the worldwide emissions attributed
to the considered region, and q represents the regional abatement. The reasoning behind
Eq. 4 is as follows: if the region covers a fraction a of the globe’s emissions, a reduction
by 10% of its emissions will typically cost the region approximately a times as much as
a reduction of 10% of worldwide emissions would cost the whole world. Replacing the
example of 10% by a continuum of reductions and using q for absolute values rather than
percentages then directly yields Eq. 4. 2
The situation is di￿erent when considering the bene￿t. If the region of size a covers only a
fraction of the global emissions, the bene￿t curve to be considered is not primarily scaled
down by a speci￿c constant factor, but remains the same: climate bene￿ts from emission
reductions do not depend on the place where they arise; the global bene￿ts from a regional
abatement are the same as they are from abatements taking place globally, implying
b(q) = bg(q): (5)
2One may note that Weitzman (1974) contains an equation similar to Eq. 4, for the case where
a production is made by a number of similar units in parallel. The focus there, however, lies on the
question whether a planner should use price or quantity measures when he can impose rules on all units
simultaneously instead of, as here, on how one single unit should be treated independently of the other
units.
8In the following, we examine the implications of this analysis for the case of di￿erent
limits of climate policies.
Fully altruistic region. This section considers a region that constitutes a fraction a of
the world (resp. of its emissions) and that implements a climate policy by fully taking
into account the global emission externalities rather than only the fraction borne by its
own citizens. For this case, Eqs. 4 and 5 can be used directly. Applying them to the
































Eq. 6 shows that limiting the scope of the policy to a fraction a of the planet augments
the cost function’s concavity by the factor 1
a > 1, which tends to support the price policy
over the quantities policy, at least relative to the basic Weitzman result.
Region with some degree of egoism. The situation becomes even more clear if the
region discounts the remainder of the world’s utility, considering it only as a fraction
d < 1: in this case, while the cost curve is the same as for the altruistic region, the





, and the second
derivative is therefore b00(q) =  (a + (1   a)d)b. Recalling from the previous case that
c00(q) =
c
a , we see that here the ratio of the bene￿t over the cost curvature is decreased
through the multiplication by an overall factor a(a + (1   a)d), which is smaller than a
and becomes as small as a2 for a perfectly egoistic country 3, yielding an even stronger
case for a price measure rather than a quantity measure in this case.
Suboptimally low climate targets. Finally, consider the case where a policy may
extend across the globe but has a limited reach for various reasons that eventually limit
the ability of the society to fully account for the climate bene￿ts when choosing the policy.
This situation can readily be accounted in a similar manner to the case of a policy in a
3The latter case of the pure quadratic term may not be the most relevant as a perfectly egoistic country
of a small size is unlikely to implement any substantial climate protection measures. Nevertheless, it
surely holds that countries will generally discount the remaining world’s bene￿ts to a certain extent when
implementing a climate policy.
9region with limited empathy for the rest of the world by assuming only a fraction e,
0 < e < 1, of the climate bene￿ts to be considered for the policy choice. In this case, the






and implying b00(q) =  eb. Again, the abatement cost curve remains unchanged. This
type of limitation of the reach of the policy likewise favors the price scheme, in this case
by augmenting the ratio by the factor e < 1.
This factor appears quite relevant when considering realistic climate policies. Climate
protection measures that are accepted are typically so limited that it seems that only
a limited fraction of the predictable climate damages are taken into account as costs.
Another explanation could be that abatement costs are perceived as higher than they are
according to economic analysis. In this case, the abatement costs curve may be augmented
by a factor 1
e > 1 instead. Dividing the costs by a factor e is, however, largely equivalent
to multiplying the bene￿ts curve by the same factor e and thus would lead to the same
conclusions for the present analysis of the prices versus quantities question.
Clearly, the previous subsection has already shown that an egoistic region will opt for
a suboptimally low reduction target. Thus, one might argue that the fact that realistic
climate policies are not very stringent can already be explained by the regionality of the
policy. However, this does not fully explain the hesitation of people or institutions to take
into account all of the bene￿ts, hypothetically assuming that once climate policies are
implemented worldwide, there would most likely be plenty of room for people favoring an
abatement level that is, from an economic perspective, considerably below the optimal
abatement. Now, one could still argue that, while this may indeed be the case, we could
still opt for policy that takes this problem into account and that the whole bene￿ts
should therefore be considered. However, the policy should be implemented according to
the preferences of the deciding institutions, and it should be optimized accordingly in a
positivist manner.
Policy with simultaneous limitations. Finally, the case that yields the least stringent
measures favors price measures the most because of the culmination of the various points
mentioned previously, and, last but not least, to the detriment of the climate, is the most
realistic. Currently, climate agreements of only a regional extent may be introduced, the
corresponding policies may not fully account for the externality, and they may do so even
less for the part of the world outside of the mentioned region. In this case, the cost and
bene￿t functions to be considered become




















00(q) =  (a + (1   a)d)eb:
The overall factor by which the ratio of the relative curvature of the bene￿t curve over
the cost curve di￿ers from the original ratio for the globally optimal policy is then a 
e  (a + (1   a)d)), which eventually becomes a very small number as a < 1, e < 1, and
d < 1.
We thus have that
b00(q)
c00(q)






which is the main result of this paper.
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cg(qr)>  c''  cg(qg)  c''  
Figure 2: Regionality of a policy reducing the 2nd derivative of the abatement bene￿ts
curve and increasing it for the abatement cost curve. c and b stand for abatement costs
resp. bene￿ts, q for the optimal abatement level, and the indexes g and r indicate global
resp. regional variables.
4 Prices over Quantities for Kyoto
The example of the Kyoto protocol, which is thus far the single most important regional
climate treaty, provides a good example for the illustration of the results of this study.
Clearly, the way it is implemented, it is able to reduce global medium-term emissions only
by a small percentage. Similarly, the e￿ects of the protocol on global warming are very
11modest. Wigley (1998) projected that if sustained for the entire century, the protocol ac-
cord itself may lead to a reduction of the global temperature increase by roughly 0.1-0.2 ￿C,
or eventually 6% of the expected increase through 2100, and if the protocol were to be
strengthened progressively throughout the century in a reasonable way, it could eventually
reduce global warming by some 14%. Aside from the question of whether these numbers
might require some correction, their orders of magnitude seem fairly realistic. So what
do they suggest about the curvatures of the relevant curves for climate bene￿ts and eco-
nomic costs? Clearly, even if the curvature of the climate damage costs is substantial, the
marginal climate costs of emissions in a world where 100% of business-as-usual warming
occurred are very close to the marginal costs of additional units in a case with only 90%
of this business as usual warming, that is, business as usual for the year 2100 minus the
mean of reductions of a Kyoto protocol that is unsustained, -6%, resp. sustained, -14%.
If the climate cost curve is convex, the climate costs attributed to an additional unit of
emissions may be very high, but they are unlikely to di￿er substantially between the two
di￿erent amounts of total emissions or warming. 4 Things look di￿erent for the economic
abatement costs: compared with their projected business-as-usual scenario, the emissions
reductions agreed upon by the Annex I countries amounted to somewhere between 0 and
20% for most of the countries. Clearly, the costs of marginal emission reductions of zero
versus 10% or 20% emission reductions are likely to substantially di￿er as a result of
the fact that the most inexpensive emission abatement measures are opted for initially,
followed by the implementation of ever more expensive measures.
The relevant abatement bene￿t curve is thus very likely to be substantially ￿atter than
the abatement cost curve. According to the adapted rule of Eq. 7 this implies that
price mechanisms such as a carbon tax may have reduced the expected losses that accrue
because of imprecision in the estimates of the costs and the bene￿ts. Thus, even for a
relevant policy measure such as the Kyoto accord, there seems to be little possibility for
quantity measures to be theoretically as e￿cient as price measures. The same argument
illustrates that for a unilateral policy a￿ecting an even smaller region, such as a small
or medium-sized single country, it becomes virtually certain that the uncertainty under
consideration favors price measures over quantity measures.
5 Robustness
The above analysis is based on quadratic functions. While these functions are consistent
with relevant literature and convenient to work with in the context of uncertainty-induced
welfare losses, they are subject to a speci￿c feature that ignores a certain aspect that
4The study of Wigley (1998) also predicted that Kyoto may reduce business as usual sea level rise of
50cm until 2100 by a mere 2.5cm, strengthening the view of hardly varying marginal abatement bene￿ts.
12may be relevant in reality. The constancy of these functions’ second derivatives over the
argument hides the fact that even for speci￿c curves the ratio of the cost and bene￿t
curves’ second derivatives may also vary as the optimal versus the opted for abatement
level changes. Here, the aforementioned change from the global to the regional policy will
a￿ect not only the cost and bene￿t curves but also the chosen abatement levels. Because
the regional marginal abatement costs are higher than the global ones and because the
considered bene￿ts curve is either unchanged (completely altruistic region) or reduced
(partially egoistic region), the total abatement level considered in the regional policy is
most likely considerably lower than that of an (optimal) global policy. This endogeneity
of the abatement level would be relevant if, instead of the quadratic cost and bene￿t
functions, other forms were considered.
A natural alternative is to consider isoelastic functions for both curves, cg(qg) = cqc
g
and bg(qg) = bqb
g . Preservation of convexity of the cost curve and of the concavity of
the bene￿ts curve requires c > 1 and b < 1. Interestingly, for this functional form, the
previously discussed e￿ect of the limitation of the climate policy on regional measures
vanishes. At the endogenous optimal abatement levels the ratio of the bene￿t and cost
curves under consideration turn out to be independent of the size a of the region im-
plementing the policy, of its altruism index d, and of the cost discounting factor e, as
is shown in Appendix B. At ￿rst glance, this result may appear to limit the validity of
the analysis in the previous sections. Assuming isoelastic cost and bene￿t curves, the
theoretical answer to the question of prices versus quantities is una￿ected by either of the
proposed limitations of climate policies in this paper. Yet, a closer examination shows
that rather than the result from the quadratic functions, the result for isoelastic functions
is only an artifact based on speci￿c function properties that are at odds with reality. With
a concave isoelastic speci￿cation, the absolute magnitude of the curvature of the bene￿t
curve rapidly grows to in￿nity as the abatement level approaches zero. It is this growth of
the bene￿t curve’s curvature that o￿sets the increase of the curvature of the cost function
as the region that implements the policy becomes smaller.
In reality, however, the curvature of the bene￿ts curve is clearly considered to be ￿nite. To
clarify, it may be considered that the emission abatement bene￿t curve is simply a mirror
image5 of the climate damage curve for speci￿c emissions, normalized to zero for the
business-as-usual emissions. There is no apparent reason why this damage curve should
exhibit a singularity at the level of business-as-usual emissions. For the atmosphere, the
amount of emissions in the business-as-usual scenario is an amount like any other potential
amount as well. In any case, the expected damage curve is usually considered to be a
steadily increasing function with ￿nite ￿rst and second derivatives, i.e. the curvature of
the emission damages curve ￿ and thus the curvature of the abatement bene￿t curve ￿ is
5Meant is an inversion of the sign of both axes of the curve.
13bounded upwards. In the following argument, it is shown that this boundedness of the
curvature of the abatement bene￿ts strongly suggests that the main point of this paper
holds independently of speci￿c functional form assumptions.
We focus on the case of a regional climate policy designed in a fully altruistic way in terms
of accounting for abatement bene￿ts, i.e., the original global emission abatement curve
is considered. Concerning the abatement costs of the region, its curvature is to increase
proportionally as the region ￿ assumed to contain a representative fraction of the global
economy’s abatement possibilities ￿ becomes smaller. This can readily be understood as
one considers the lower bound, kg, of the curvature of the global abatement cost curve,
kg = minqg c00
g(qg). As has been explained in the Policy with Limited Reach section, a
positive non-zero lower bound on the curvature is likely to exist, because of the large
range of di￿erent abatement possibilities, i.e., kg > 0. From the same section, we know
that c(q) = acg(
q
a). It is easy to verify that then k = 1
akg, where k = minq c00(q) the
lower bound of the regional abatement cost curvature, i.e., the (minimal) curvature of
the regional abatement cost function increases proportionally as the size of the region
decreases. Thus, for a small enough region the curvature of the abatement cost necessarily
becomes larger than that of the bene￿t curve (whose value has a ￿nite upper bound, as
argued above), independently of the speci￿c functional forms that we assume for either
curve.6
This also suggests that the above example of the isoelastic curves failed to identify the
e￿ect of the policy’s regionality on the price versus quantity outcome simply because
the assumed form of the bene￿t curve was unrealistic, as it implied a bene￿t curvature
that becomes huge when approaching low abatement values, rather than being bounded
upwards.
6 Discussion
The general validity of the main result ￿ that the uncertainty under consideration clearly
favors price mechanisms over quantity measures for small economies ￿ is also con￿rmed
by a more intuitive argumentation without any speci￿c mathematical support. It may
be worthwhile to do so in order to prevent suspicion of whether the main result will
remain if functional forms other than those considered in this study were taken into
6Strictly speaking, the crucial relation of Eq. 4 hardly holds for incredibly tiny regions a, which in the
extreme could comprise only a single production place with little scope for relevant emission abatement
possibilities with marginal costs ranging over a number of orders of magnitudes. However, even if we
limit our attention to the smaller among the developed countries (countries from the developed world
currently appear more likely to implement substantial unilateral climate measures than others), they
are large enough for their economies to contain the relevant large range of activities leading to strongly
convex abatement cost curves.
14account, respectively of whether the curvature-boundedness conditions relied upon in the
robustness analysis are misleading. Consider that global emission reductions provide some
global economic bene￿ts as opposed to some emission abatement costs. These abatement
costs and bene￿ts can also be considered functions of relative abatement e￿orts. If the
country or region reduces its emissions by a speci￿c fraction, this will lead to speci￿c
bene￿ts and costs. If, from a global perspective, the world abates a small fraction of its
emissions, the marginal abatement costs are likely to be very low. However, the costs
may become exorbitantly high if almost all emissions are to be abated, i.e., the cost curve
exhibits substantial convexity.
The same holds for a small region abating its emissions. Abating a small percentage of
its emissions will induce small marginal costs, and abating almost all its own emissions
will imply huge marginal abatement costs. This similarity does not hold for the bene￿ts
curve. Climate change costs are widely seen as being largely convex. However, the global
abatement curve, which is the mirror image of the climate change costs, is concave. If the
world reduces its emissions by a small fraction, the per-unit climate bene￿ts are expected
to be large, whereas when abating almost all of its emissions, additional emission savings
will induce only very limited additional bene￿ts. The situation is di￿erent for small
regions. If small enough, a region faces a virtually ￿at curve of (global or regional)
climate bene￿ts from its own relative abatements. If it abates only a small fraction of its
emissions, the marginal climate bene￿ts may be substantial, and then they will remain
so also if almost all of its emissions are abated, with the marginal bene￿t in both cases
primarily depending on the amount of emissions of the remainder of the world, which is
largely independent of the small region. Thus, as the abatement bene￿ts from a small
region are virtually linear, the abatement bene￿ts curve under consideration is clearly
more curved than the abatement cost curve.
Hoel and Karp (2002) suggests that, as cumulative emissions matter more than instan-
taneously exhausted gases, bg() may be quite linear in the relevant short run. 7 Together







 . Considering in addition Eq. 7 implies that for any
policy whose extent is seriously limited - either as it covers only a fraction of the world’s
emissions, or as it is substantially less ambitious than an optimal policy would have to be
￿ the probability of jb00()j > jc00()j seems indeed to become vanishingly small.
The bene￿ts ‘discounted’ by the factors e and a+(1 a)d do not re￿ect the real global long-
term bene￿ts of climate protection (which may arguably be calculated, e.g., by attributing
at least nearly the same weight to future generations as to the present population). It
7The long run cost-bene￿t is relevant, but as the policy can be updated more or less regularly if new
information is available, the mentioned paper studies the problem in a dynamic setting, with the result
that the curvature of the abatement bene￿t from one policy period to the next is relevant rather than
the curvature over the long run.
15is important to note that this fact does not alter the fundamental result in Weitzman
(1974) of the optimality of a price versus a quantity measure for given cost and bene￿t
curvatures. For example, consider a country that only takes the domestic bene￿ts of a
policy into account (implying a < 1 and d = 0) and does so by strongly discounting
the future population’s bene￿ts (eventually leading to a low value for e). Policies are
legitimized by policymakers by virtue of the fact that they are acting according to the
population’s preferences. They must implement a policy that is optimal with respect to
the climate bene￿ts as the population considers them, regardless of whether these are
shortsighted or somewhat egoistic. This implies that when using the Weitzman result of
Eq. 3, the considered cost and bene￿t curves must be taken into account. Ultimately,
we arrive at our result, expressed in Eq. 7 for quadratic functions, and to a conclusion
that continues to con￿rm the main result, according to our robustness analysis, if other
realistic functional forms are assumed as well.
7 Conclusions
Weitzman’s (1974) result provided a still often cited theoretical basis for the potential
equivalence of price and quantity measures, in terms of minimizing welfare losses induced
by the uncertainty about the cost and bene￿t curves in the area of climate policy. His
result stated that the optimal choice depends on the relative size of the second derivatives
of the marginal abatement cost and bene￿t. Intuitively, it may not seem clear which type
of measure will minimize the uncertainty related to welfare losses in climate policy. Not
only do emission abatement cost functions seem highly convex, but the global climate
damage function also implies strongly concave abatement bene￿t functions. However,
realistic climate policies are unlikely to cover all of the world’s emissions and seem to be
much less stringent than seems economically optimal. The analysis in this paper shows
how these limitations of climate policies imply that the cost and bene￿t curves under
consideration di￿er from the global estimates in a way that strongly suggests that price
measures seem preferable for most climate measures, notably the Kyoto protocol. Surely,
such measures would be preferable for any conceivable unilateral policy implemented
by small- or medium-sized countries. As explained, with respect to their own potential
emission abatements, small economies face virtually linear climatic abatement bene￿t
curves in any case, implying that rather than considering a truly curved bene￿t function,
they should exhibit a willingness to pay for avoided emissions that is independent of their
own abatement level. In the case of a small economy, uncertainty-driven welfare losses
are thus found to be unambiguously lower for tax measures compared to quota measures.
This holds for rational small economies independently of whether their concern for the
climate is driven primarily by egoistic or altruistic motives.
16Clearly, there exist additional advantages and disadvantages attached to any speci￿c
climate policy, often important for practical implementability, as discussed, e.g., by Nord-
haus (2005). He also explains why the to be considered climate bene￿t curve is anyway
relatively ￿at. This is due to the fact that what matters is the stock of emissions in
the atmosphere rather than the rate of exhaustion, supporting this paper’s claims of the
superiority of the price schemes for unilateral or otherwise limited policies.
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(A) Additional Graphical Illustrations
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Figure 3: Tax or Quota induced welfare loss from imprecision in abatement bene￿t
estimation.
Be the amount of tradable permits or the tax rate chosen based on an imprecise estimate
^ mb of the marginal abatement bene￿ts instead of the true marginal bene￿ts curve mb.
When the marginal cost curve (mc) is precisely estimated, the welfare losses (blue surface)
accruing due to the imprecision in the ￿xation of the amount of tradable permits are the
same as the losses from the imprecision in the level of the tax.
18(ii) Additivity of Expected Losses from Uncertainty about Climate Bene￿ts















































Figure 4: Additivity of welfare losses from uncertainty about climate bene￿ts and welfare
losses from uncertainty about abatement costs.
The left part of Fig. 4 illustrates welfare losses (corresponding to the black surfaces)
accruing due to some variability in the estimation of the marginal climate bene￿t curve.
The right part of Fig. 4 illustrates the expected welfare loss (light green surface) accruing
if the marginal cost curve is overestimated, as well as by how much this loss increases if
in addition there is some variability in the estimation of the marginal bene￿t curve - it
is easy to see that this increase corresponds to the size of the black surfaces in the right
￿gure. Also, the geometry of the graphs implies that black surfaces in the left part of Fig.
4 must have the same size as the ones in the right part, indicating that the welfare losses
accruing under some imprecision in costs as well as of bene￿ts simply correspond to the
sum of the welfare losses accruing under imprecision only in the cost estimate plus the
losses accruing under imprecision only in the bene￿ts.
(B) Constancy of Relative Curvatures for Isoelastic Cost and Ben-
e￿t Functions







where c > 1 and 0 < b < 1 and strictly positive s would guarantee that the curves are
strictly increasing, the cost curve convex and the bene￿t curve concave.
19The second derivatives of the respective functions take the form (1   )q 2
g , and thus
depend on the abatement level qg - notably they become in￿nitely large as qg reaches zero.
The optimal abatement level q









































The second equality shows that the curvature ratio is independent of the scale parameters
 at the optimal global abatement level q
g which itself does depend on these parameters
.
It is straightforward to see that this implies that the ratio of the curvatures does not
change if a regional policy is considered instead of the global policy: the transformation
c(q) = cg(
q
a)  a as well as a scaling of the bene￿ts curve b(q) = (a + (1   a)d)  e  bg(q)
(see section Policy with Limited Reach in the main text) correspond to simple changes
in the parameters c and b, but do not a￿ect the exponents c or b. As we just have
shown, the relative curvatures do not depend on the values c and b in the region of the
rationally opted for abatement level. Thus, if the costs and bene￿ts of emission reductions
would both follow isoelastic curves, the ratio of the curvatures would not depend on the
regionality of the climate policies for the endogenous relevant abatement target.
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